Nuri al-Said and the Sharifians
Middle East Study Group
Grand Lake Neighborhood Center
July 8, 2006
A Note on Nuri al-Said and the Sharifians
Nuri al-Said is the major figure among the so-called “Sharifians”—the ex-Ottoman Arab officers who joined Sharif Husayn’s Arab Revolt (June 1916-Oct. 1918), formed an Arab nationalist government in Syria (1918-20), and became Faisal’s ruling military elite in Iraq from 1921 on. Since Nuri was Faisal’s most trusted commander in his desert campaign against the Turks and his right-hand man at the Paris peace talks, it was inevitable that he would assume a key position in Faisal’s Iraqi government. As it turned out, Nuri al-Said served fourteen terms as prime minister before he was killed in the 1958 revolution.
From the outset of his career, Nuri supported strong British ties, believing that was the best guarantee of Iraq’s security. He organized the Baghdad Pact in 1955, linking Iraq and Turkey in a British-backed Cold War alliance of “northern tier” states. In the process he became Nasser’s fierce enemy. Given Nasser’s popularity across the Middle East, this was a major factor in Nuri’s 1958 overthrow, especially after the embarrassment of British, French and Israeli aggression in the Suez Crisis of 1956.
It may be useful to know a few biographical facts about Nuri’s early years as a Sharifian, as a way of understanding how the Arab nationalist movement became the third bloc of Iraq’s founding, in tension with British and Shiite interests. The main source for the following discussion is Christopher Birdwood’s 1959 biography, although Gertrude Bell’s letters, Fromkin’s A Peace to End All Peace, and other texts we have been using supply useful perspectives on Nuri and on the role of the Sharifians in establishing a tradition of military regimes in Iraq.
Nuri was born in 1882 to a lower-level Ottoman administrative official in Baghdad. Since the higher ranks of Ottoman administration were reserved for Turkish civil servants, the military was the only career path open for ambitious young Arabs like Nuri. In 1903 he was among a select group of 60-70 Iraqi cadets admitted to the Military College at Istanbul. At 18 he received his first commission (at the youngest age then recorded), then spent three years collecting taxes among the bedouin tribes. This first-hand experience with the tribes proved useful throughout his political career. Soon after the C.U.P. takeover in 1908, Nuri rejected its “Turkifying” policies and saw himself as part of the budding Arab nationalist movement which clandestine groups were forming in Paris and Damascus. In 1910 he returned to Istanbul Staff College for further studies, much of it under German officers using Turkish translators. He developed an intense dislike of the German mission and correctly feared the catastrophic consequences of a Turkish-German alliance. In 1912 he was sent to the Balkans to fight in the Empire’s losing campaign against the Bulgarian independence movement.
The turning point came in October 1913, when a charismatic Ottoman officer from Egypt, Aziz Ali al-Misri, formed an underground movement of Arab nationalist officers in Damascus called Al-Ahd (the Covenant). The goal was Arab autonomy, whether inside or outside the Empire. Nuri joined at the outset, along with his brother-in-law, Jafar al-Askari, and twelve other officers from Mesopotamia. Many of this group would later become political leaders in Iraq. In February 1914 the C.U.P. regime arrested al-Misri, charging him with planning to establish an Arab state in North Africa. When Nuri led the effort to save al-Misri, it put him into contact with Lord Kitchener’s British intelligence group in Cairo, which persuaded the Foreign Office to intervene through the British Ambassador. In April 1914, the Sultan commuted al-Misri’s death sentence and a few weeks later he was released and resettled in Egypt, where he resumed his work with the al-Ahd movement. In April, Nuri and several other al-Ahd leaders went underground to avoid arrest. Nuri wound up in Basra in June, seeking protection with Sayid Talib, who was the leader of the Arab nationalist movement in Iraq. (After British and Ottoman hostilities broke out in November, Talib contacted the British government in India, pledging his support against the Turks with an obvious interest in becoming the British-backed ruler of Iraq.) While in Basra, Nuri developed a lung condition that forced him to seek treatment at the American Military Hospital. Fearing arrest there, he persuaded Sir Percy Cox to get him into India (technically, as a POW). For eleven months, Nuri remained under “house arrest” near Ahmednagar, learning English while recuperating, and helping the British make contacts with Iraqi Arab leaders. In December 1915, al-Misri was able to bring Nuri to Cairo, where he joined other Arab activists who were working with the group of British intelligence “experts” (Hogarth, Clayton, and T.E. Lawrence, et al) later known as the Arab Bureau, which operated informally out of the Savoy Hotel.
In July 1916, when Faisal was engaged in the first military stage of the Arab Revolt, Nuri left Cairo with weapons, supplies and gold (for bribing tribal sheikhs) to assist Faisal’s campaign against the Ottoman force at Medina. Nuri soon became the chief of staff for Faisal’s forces and with al-Askari and the indefatigable T.E. Lawrence, led the desert guerrilla campaign that was co-ordinated with Gen. Allenby’s 1918 offensive in Palestine and Syria. Fromkin describes the soap opera climax in Damascus, where Nuri represented Faisal’s victorious forces and (using some trickery) succeeded in installing an Arab governor in the teeth of the French general’s opposition. However, as Fromkin describes it, Faisal, Nuri and the Arab leaders had not learned the details of the Sykes-Picot agreement until this time, and felt betrayed by the British. They thus joined in a dual task—to govern Syria from Damascus (officially, as the British Occupation force) while lobbying in London and Paris to undo the wartime agreement that would give France control of Syria. Nuri thus played an active role in the Syrian Arab nationalist administration, as well as serving as Faisal’s military adviser and liaison officer in Paris in 1919.
The rest of Nuri’s story is more about Iraq than about Syria, since Faisal’s poorly equipped Syrian defenders were defeated by a French invasion force (mostly Senegalese and North African troops from French-controlled states) in July 1920. (I have found no mention of Nuri’s presence at the battle at Maysalun, although Birdwood says he accompanied Faisal into exile. If Nuri had participated in the battle, I assume it would be noted somewhere.) As we know from Gertrude Bell’s letters, in late 1919 Nuri was already counted on as a key figure in Bell’s own plan for a British-backed Arab state. (We may recall that her Syrian Report, arguing the case for an Arab government in Iraq, drew upon her 1919 contacts with Faisal and Lawrence in Paris, with General Clayton in Cairo, and with Arab nationalists in Damascus.) In the new cheaper and “softer” strategy for imperialist control, which Winston Churchill (as incoming Colonial Secretary) adopted at the March 1921 Cairo Conference, the Sharifians would play a key role.
----------------
References:
Christopher B. Birdwood, Nuri As-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (1959)
David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace (1989)
Grand Lake Neighborhood Center
July 8, 2006
A Note on Nuri al-Said and the Sharifians
Nuri al-Said is the major figure among the so-called “Sharifians”—the ex-Ottoman Arab officers who joined Sharif Husayn’s Arab Revolt (June 1916-Oct. 1918), formed an Arab nationalist government in Syria (1918-20), and became Faisal’s ruling military elite in Iraq from 1921 on. Since Nuri was Faisal’s most trusted commander in his desert campaign against the Turks and his right-hand man at the Paris peace talks, it was inevitable that he would assume a key position in Faisal’s Iraqi government. As it turned out, Nuri al-Said served fourteen terms as prime minister before he was killed in the 1958 revolution.
From the outset of his career, Nuri supported strong British ties, believing that was the best guarantee of Iraq’s security. He organized the Baghdad Pact in 1955, linking Iraq and Turkey in a British-backed Cold War alliance of “northern tier” states. In the process he became Nasser’s fierce enemy. Given Nasser’s popularity across the Middle East, this was a major factor in Nuri’s 1958 overthrow, especially after the embarrassment of British, French and Israeli aggression in the Suez Crisis of 1956.
It may be useful to know a few biographical facts about Nuri’s early years as a Sharifian, as a way of understanding how the Arab nationalist movement became the third bloc of Iraq’s founding, in tension with British and Shiite interests. The main source for the following discussion is Christopher Birdwood’s 1959 biography, although Gertrude Bell’s letters, Fromkin’s A Peace to End All Peace, and other texts we have been using supply useful perspectives on Nuri and on the role of the Sharifians in establishing a tradition of military regimes in Iraq.
Nuri was born in 1882 to a lower-level Ottoman administrative official in Baghdad. Since the higher ranks of Ottoman administration were reserved for Turkish civil servants, the military was the only career path open for ambitious young Arabs like Nuri. In 1903 he was among a select group of 60-70 Iraqi cadets admitted to the Military College at Istanbul. At 18 he received his first commission (at the youngest age then recorded), then spent three years collecting taxes among the bedouin tribes. This first-hand experience with the tribes proved useful throughout his political career. Soon after the C.U.P. takeover in 1908, Nuri rejected its “Turkifying” policies and saw himself as part of the budding Arab nationalist movement which clandestine groups were forming in Paris and Damascus. In 1910 he returned to Istanbul Staff College for further studies, much of it under German officers using Turkish translators. He developed an intense dislike of the German mission and correctly feared the catastrophic consequences of a Turkish-German alliance. In 1912 he was sent to the Balkans to fight in the Empire’s losing campaign against the Bulgarian independence movement.
The turning point came in October 1913, when a charismatic Ottoman officer from Egypt, Aziz Ali al-Misri, formed an underground movement of Arab nationalist officers in Damascus called Al-Ahd (the Covenant). The goal was Arab autonomy, whether inside or outside the Empire. Nuri joined at the outset, along with his brother-in-law, Jafar al-Askari, and twelve other officers from Mesopotamia. Many of this group would later become political leaders in Iraq. In February 1914 the C.U.P. regime arrested al-Misri, charging him with planning to establish an Arab state in North Africa. When Nuri led the effort to save al-Misri, it put him into contact with Lord Kitchener’s British intelligence group in Cairo, which persuaded the Foreign Office to intervene through the British Ambassador. In April 1914, the Sultan commuted al-Misri’s death sentence and a few weeks later he was released and resettled in Egypt, where he resumed his work with the al-Ahd movement. In April, Nuri and several other al-Ahd leaders went underground to avoid arrest. Nuri wound up in Basra in June, seeking protection with Sayid Talib, who was the leader of the Arab nationalist movement in Iraq. (After British and Ottoman hostilities broke out in November, Talib contacted the British government in India, pledging his support against the Turks with an obvious interest in becoming the British-backed ruler of Iraq.) While in Basra, Nuri developed a lung condition that forced him to seek treatment at the American Military Hospital. Fearing arrest there, he persuaded Sir Percy Cox to get him into India (technically, as a POW). For eleven months, Nuri remained under “house arrest” near Ahmednagar, learning English while recuperating, and helping the British make contacts with Iraqi Arab leaders. In December 1915, al-Misri was able to bring Nuri to Cairo, where he joined other Arab activists who were working with the group of British intelligence “experts” (Hogarth, Clayton, and T.E. Lawrence, et al) later known as the Arab Bureau, which operated informally out of the Savoy Hotel.
In July 1916, when Faisal was engaged in the first military stage of the Arab Revolt, Nuri left Cairo with weapons, supplies and gold (for bribing tribal sheikhs) to assist Faisal’s campaign against the Ottoman force at Medina. Nuri soon became the chief of staff for Faisal’s forces and with al-Askari and the indefatigable T.E. Lawrence, led the desert guerrilla campaign that was co-ordinated with Gen. Allenby’s 1918 offensive in Palestine and Syria. Fromkin describes the soap opera climax in Damascus, where Nuri represented Faisal’s victorious forces and (using some trickery) succeeded in installing an Arab governor in the teeth of the French general’s opposition. However, as Fromkin describes it, Faisal, Nuri and the Arab leaders had not learned the details of the Sykes-Picot agreement until this time, and felt betrayed by the British. They thus joined in a dual task—to govern Syria from Damascus (officially, as the British Occupation force) while lobbying in London and Paris to undo the wartime agreement that would give France control of Syria. Nuri thus played an active role in the Syrian Arab nationalist administration, as well as serving as Faisal’s military adviser and liaison officer in Paris in 1919.
The rest of Nuri’s story is more about Iraq than about Syria, since Faisal’s poorly equipped Syrian defenders were defeated by a French invasion force (mostly Senegalese and North African troops from French-controlled states) in July 1920. (I have found no mention of Nuri’s presence at the battle at Maysalun, although Birdwood says he accompanied Faisal into exile. If Nuri had participated in the battle, I assume it would be noted somewhere.) As we know from Gertrude Bell’s letters, in late 1919 Nuri was already counted on as a key figure in Bell’s own plan for a British-backed Arab state. (We may recall that her Syrian Report, arguing the case for an Arab government in Iraq, drew upon her 1919 contacts with Faisal and Lawrence in Paris, with General Clayton in Cairo, and with Arab nationalists in Damascus.) In the new cheaper and “softer” strategy for imperialist control, which Winston Churchill (as incoming Colonial Secretary) adopted at the March 1921 Cairo Conference, the Sharifians would play a key role.
----------------
References:
Christopher B. Birdwood, Nuri As-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (1959)
David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace (1989)
